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Abstract 
This paper suggests a solution to what has become known as the "private equity premium 
puzzle" (Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)). We interpret occupational choice as a 
dynamic portfolio choice problem of a life-cycle investor facing a liquidity constraint and 
imperfect information about the profitability of potential businesses. In this setting, becoming 
an entrepreneur is equivalent to investing in non-traded private equity capital subject to 
transaction costs. We model the return on private equity as the sum of two components, the 
individual ability of the entrepreneur and idiosyncratic business risk. Information is imperfect, 
because only entrepreneurs observe their own business risk realizations. Using numerical 
techniques we find that the model generates the observed return structure for private equity 
using standard CRRA-preferences and fully rational expectations. 
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1 Introduction
Recently, Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) have documented in a
highly interesting paper the risk-return structure and the portfolio allocation
of private equity in the US. Private equity is de…ned as the equity capital
of …rms that are not listed in the stock market and which is therefore not
traded publicly. They …nd that average private equity ex-post returns are
comparable to average ex-post returns on public equity, but also that the
distribution of individual returns is very wide and skewed to the left. At
the same time, investment in private equity is extremely concentrated with
most entrepreneurial households investing the majority of their wealth in a
single …rm. In addition, the majority of the equity capital of a single …rm
is regularly held by a single private investor who also has a management
interest in the …rm. The authors conclude that, given the concentration in
individual portfolios and the large idiosyncratic risk associated with private
equity, investment in private …rms seems to be dominated by investment in
publicly traded equity for risk-averse individuals and term this …nding the
“private equity premium puzzle”.1
Studying the empirical results in more detail, there are two di¤erent di-
mensions of this puzzle. The “corporate …nance”-dimension is why most
private …rms are controlled by a single shareholder. As shown by Bitler,
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen 2002, a simple moral hazard model goes a
long way toward explaining this …nding. The “portfolio choice”-dimension
seems to be more di¢cult to explain. The issue is, why entrepreneurs are
willing to hold the equity of a single …rm given the unfavorable variance-
return characteristics of the asset. As correctly observed by Moskowitz and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), this behavior violates the participation constraint
in the moral hazard game. In the following, we propose a resolution to the
“portfolio-dimension” of the puzzle by showing that the observed structure
of ex-post private equity returns and the concentrated portfolio allocations
of private equity emerge from a simple model of occupational choice over the
life-cycle. We …nd that the realized rate of return on an index of non-traded
private equity is only slightly higher than the return on a riskless, friction-
lessly traded asset. We also con…rm the conjecture that the index return
overestimates the average cross-sectional return on private equity and …nd
1 In the previously circulated version of their paper Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen
(2002) claimed the existence of the puzzle. The published version quali…es this claim and
calls for more theoretical work taking into account the correlation of returns to …nancial
and human capital and optimal dynamic consumption choice. Our model is designed in
order to address precisely these points.
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that this average basically equals the return on the frictionlessly traded asset.
At the same time, cross-sectional returns to private equity are very volatile
and for agents holding private equity, these holdings represent a large share
of their total wealth.
In addition to these …ndings, our model also replicates other facts about
entrepreneurship and private businesses. The aggregate value of private eq-
uity roughly equals 1=2 of the aggregate value of traded assets, as reported
by Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002). Firm survival rates are low for
young …rms and the average age of private …rms is 12:6 years, roughly in line
with the 10:7 years reported by Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002).
The distribution of total wealth is skewed to the left and much more unequal
than the distribution of income. Entrepreneurs are on average 3:6 times
wealthier than agents not holding private equity and 38% of total wealth is
owned by entrepreneurs, who represent a share of only 13:6% of the pop-
ulation, which are statistics that roughly match the estimates provided by
Gentry and Hubbard (2000).
Following Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) we take the decision
to become an entrepreneur as being equivalent to the decision of investing in
private equity. While in principle, business ownership does not necessarily
imply that the business owner also chooses to be an entrepreneur and spends
his time running the …rm, Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) …nd that
70% of business owners also have an active management interest in the sin-
gle …rm they are investing in. Hence, they …nd that the “single proprietor
model” of entrepreneurship accounts for most of the data and we agree with
their conclusions. When giving this interpretation to the choice of becoming
an entrepreneur however, it is also important to consider the special kind of
investment environment in which this choice is embedded. First, the choice of
becoming an entrepreneur has strong implications for the life-cycle consump-
tion pro…le. We argue that the appropriate setting for studying occupational
choice is a life-cycle model with liquidity-constrained, …nitely-lived agents
who in each period can decide to be entrepreneurs or workers. The decision
to accumulate assets is endogenous in this framework and motivated by the
fact that post-retirement income is considerably lower than wage income.
We allow for stochastic lifetimes, but take wage and retirement income as
exogenous and stochastic over the lifecycle.
Second, the …nancial market in this setting is inherently incomplete and
it is necessary to take into account both, the risk component of starting and
running a business, and the transaction costs associated with it. Becoming
2
an entrepreneur is equivalent to forgoing the wage earned in the labor market
and starting a new business. This implies creating a new type of …nancial
asset by assembling various capital goods into a legal entity called a …rm
and issuing control rights in the form of private equity. This newly created
asset is initially not traded in a public asset market2. It is likely that full
information about the return characteristics of the asset becomes available
only upon creation of the asset and that the transaction costs associated
with entrepreneurship are quite high. In our model, all agents are informed
about the conditional distribution of the returns to entrepreneurship, but
only entrepreneurs observe their business risk realization. It is a central
assumption of the model that the rate of return on private equity depends on
the skills of the entrepreneur. Due to the incompleteness of …nancial markets,
agents cannot sell their own private equity or hold other agent’s private
equity. It is this short-selling constraint, the existence of transaction costs
and the serial correlation in returns to entrepreneurship, which makes the
optimal portfolio choice inherently dynamic and requires numerical solution
methods.
Two factors mainly drive the result. First, agents with standard utility
functions and standard levels of risk aversion do not require a large excess
return of 10% to hold an asset with empirically observed levels of volatility.
This is a well-established result …rst reported by Mehra and Prescott (1985).
Second and more importantly, average rates of return on private equity are
not independent of the age of the entrepreneur or the age of the business.
Clearly, the existence of start-up costs which will be amortized over time
implies that young businesses have lower average rates of return than ma-
ture businesses. In addition, very young businesses have a high failure rate,
because of entrepreneurs learning about their business risk realization.
A little less obvious, young agents require lower average rates of return
to start a business than older agents. The persistence in private equity
returns and the imperfect information about returns make it attractive for
wealthy young agents to start a business even if the average expected return
is low. The reason for this is the possibility of exit, if the business return
realization is bad. E¤ectively, this means that the present value of the loss
associated with low realizations of business returns is bounded. On the other
2The procedure to convert non-traded private equity into traded public equity is called
Initial Public O¤ering. We believe that our model is a good starting point for modeling
IPO’s, but limit our analysis to …rms that do not ultimately go public. This is not
likely to a¤ect our results much, since Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) show that
accounting for IPO’s increases the relevant rate of return on private equity by only 0.5%
annually.
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hand, if the business return realization is good, the present value of the gain
associated with it can be fully reaped by the young agents. Since agents
cannot borrow against future income, some highly skilled agents are deterred
from starting a business by insu¢cient wealth. Since the expected rate of
return on private equity depends positively on the skills of an agent, especially
wealthy individuals with high wage income tend to start private businesses
early in life.
Further, young agents face increasing income pro…les and their current
consumption is low for exogenous reasons (the liquidity constraint and an in-
creasing income pro…le). Hence, negative return shocks do not have a strong
impact on lifetime utility, since their income is guaranteed to increase in the
future. Later in life, income is projected to decrease and agents therefore
seek to avoid holding a risky asset, even if its returns are relatively high.
Together with the fact that the weight of young agents in the US popula-
tion is relatively large, these e¤ects lead to relatively low average individual
returns in the cross-section. The index return is not a¤ected that much how-
ever, because young businesses tend to be small and young agents own young
businesses.
The next section provides a brief overview of the literature on occupa-
tional choice and optimal portfolios in life-cycle models. Section 3 presents
the model in detail. In section 4 we discuss calibration issues and present
results for a canonical life-cycle setup. Section 5 provides the results for the
baseline case with private equity as a non-tradable asset and considers the
determinants of entrepreneurship in our model. Sensitivity to alternative
calibrations is checked in section 6. Section 7 concludes and points to inter-
esting research topics in the future. The appendix contains a description of
our computational procedure.
2 Related literature
The theoretical literature on entrepreneurship is rather scarce. Following
Schumpeter’s treatise on economic development and entrepreneurship
(Schumpeter (1934)), little academic attention has been devoted to studying
this phenomenon. La¤ont and Kihlstrom (1979) consider risk aversion as the
main determinant of becoming an entrepreneur in a static general equilibrium
setting, but fail to provide convincing empirical evidence for their hypothesis.
In an interesting and challenging paper, Banerjee and Newman (1993) ana-
lyze the e¤ect of liquidity constraints on occupational choice in a dynamic
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growth model. They show that the equilibrium wage level and the occupa-
tional structure of the economy depend on the current distribution of wealth
if …nancial markets are imperfect and investment projects are indivisible.
Since the current distribution of wealth is itself endogenous in a dynamic
model, they show that various paths of economic development are possible
for economies with the same technological characteristics and that ultimate
outcomes crucially depend on the initial distribution of wealth. Their model
is able to rationalize radical redistribution policies in order to avoid nega-
tive long-run outcomes of aggregate dynamics. Other than Moskowitz and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), there also exists little empirical work on the re-
turn distribution of private equity. Empirical studies of entrepreneurship
have focused instead on …nding determinants of the decision to become an
entrepreneur or be self-employed. Evans and Jovanovic (1989) were among
the …rst to study the determinants of entrepreneurship, focusing in particular
on the e¤ect of receiving a large gift or bequest on the probability of becom-
ing an entrepreneur. Subsequent studies such as Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and
Rosen (1994), Hurst and Lusardi (2002) and Hamilton (2000) enlarge the set
of determinants considered, but …nd similar results concerning the positive
e¤ects of large positive income shocks.
The paper that is probably most closely related to ours is Cagetti and
DeNardi (2002), who study the decision of becoming an entrepreneur in an
overlapping generations setting. However, they focus on the wealth distribu-
tion rather than the returns to entrepreneurship and use a much more stylized
model, in which entrepreneurs operate in a secluded sector without hiring la-
bor, allowing them to jointly determine the rates of return and the amount
of assets accumulated through an entrepreneurial production function. Our
model instead takes the distribution of rates of return to entrepreneurship as
exogenous to the savings decision, but endogenously determines the share of
wealth invested in private equity at each point in time.
A large literature exists on optimal saving decisions over the life-cycle,
if liquidity constraints are binding and one asset is available. Auerbach and
Kotliko¤ (1987) and Hubbard and Judd (1987) were among the …rst to study
this issue. More recent studies including a portfolio-choice component, par-
ticipation costs and stochastic labor income are Campbell, Cocco, Gomes and
Maenhout (1999), Haliassos and Michaelides (2002) and Laibson, Repetto
and Tobacman (1998). Campbell, Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (1999) study
the implications of investing retirement assets in the stock market rather than
government bonds. Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman (1998) build a detailed
model of the US economy taking into account heterogeneity in wealth and
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education levels, but focus on the optimal saving behavior of consumers with
time-inconsistent preferences and its implications for public pension schemes.
3 Modeling occupational choice
Like Campbell, Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (1999) and Laibson, Repetto
and Tobacman (1998) our life-cycle problem is set in a partial equilibrium
context, taking the stochastic processes of asset returns and wages as given.
For computational reasons and well-known problems of dynamic general equi-
librium models to generate empirically plausible asset returns, this is a stan-
dard approach in the dynamic portfolio choice literature. We also abstract
from aggregate uncertainty and assume that the aggregate economy grows
at a deterministic rate. Therefore, we are not able to capture business cycle
e¤ects and focus on the relative return structure of private to public equity
instead. Individuals have …nite, stochastic lifetimes and we set a …xed re-
tirement date. There is no bequest motive. There are two types of assets
available in the economy. The …rst type is a …nancial asset traded in public
markets and denoted by Bit. The second type of asset, denoted by Sit; is
non-traded private equity capital invested in a …rm which is managed by the
same entrepreneurial household.
Household i 2 f1; 2; :::; Ig maximizes utility over a …nite horizon of T
periods:
max
cit;Bi;t+1;Si;t+1
E0
"
TX
t=1
±t
Ã
tY
j=1
pj
!
u(cit)
#
; (1)
where ± is a discount factor and pt denotes the probability of being alive
at date t; conditional on being alive at date t¡ 1; subject to the following
budget constraint, involving the parameters © for a …xed cost of startup and
¹ for partial irreversibility of investment.
cit = wit + (1 + r)Bit ¡Bi;t+1 ¡ µwit + (1 + vit)Sit ¡ Si;t+1 ¡ ::: (2)
:::¡ 1(Sit = 0; Si;t+1 > 0)© ¡ ¹max(0; Sit ¡ Si;t+1)
and short-sale constraints on the two available assets
Bit ¸ 0; Sit ¸ 0;8t (3)
Exogenous income has an age-dependent deterministic component
¹wt = g(t); for 1 · t · P
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and
¹wt = ¹b; for P < t · T
where P denotes the …xed retirement age. In addition, there is uninsurable
idiosyncratic income risk "it such that
logwit = log ¹wt + "it
The stochastic income component is described by
"it = Á"i;t¡1 + Àit;
where Àit is an i.i.d. shock distributed as
Àit » N ¡0; ¾2À¢ :
The …nancial asset traded in public markets, Bit, yields a certain rate of
return r. The asset corresponding to investment in the own private …rm, Sit;
yields an idiosyncratic return
vit = ¹v + ½"it + ³it; (4)
which consists of an average guaranteed return, ¹v; a skill component, perfectly
correlated to the uninsurable idiosyncratic income risk, ½"it, and a business
risk component, ³it. The business risk component is orthogonal to the skills
component and evolves according to
³it = Ã³i;t¡1 + »it;
where »it is an i.i.d. shock distributed as
»it »N
¡
0; ¾2»
¢
:
and every newly created business receives an initial draw from the steady
state distribution of ³.
A crucial feature of the model are the assumptions relating to the infor-
mation on the uncertainty realizations available to the agents. We assume
that each individual can observe the realization of idiosyncratic income risk
at each point in time. However, it is assumed that business risk is unobserved
prior to starting a business. This implies that only entrepreneurs, de…ned
as having a portfolio with a strictly positive level of private equity, can use
conditional distributions of returns in their optimal decisions by applying
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transition probabilities over the states of business risk. Non-entrepreneurs
are facing the unconditional distribution of business risk.
Investment in private equity is subject to transaction costs, which rep-
resent start-up costs of becoming an entrepreneur, 1(Sit = 0; Sit+1 > 0)©,
and costly investment irreversibility, ¹max(0; Sit ¡ Sit+1). As in Abel and
Eberly (1994) or Dixit and Pindyck (1998) ¹ represents the wedge between
the purchase and sale price of private equity3.
The structure of this problem is close to a standard dynamic portfolio
choice problem for a …nite horizon investor introduced by Samuelson (1969)
and Merton (1969). The distinguishing features of our model are the exis-
tence of transaction costs, the fact that returns to private equity capital are
correlated with exogenous income, and the informational assumption that
returns to the entrepreneurial asset are observed only when its share in the
portfolio is strictly positive. These assumptions together with the short sale
constraints require the use of numerical techniques to …nd the solution of the
problem.
4 Calibration
We set the maximum lifetime of agents in our model to 89 years and assume
that agents enter the model at age 20. In order to economize on computa-
tional resources, we choose a period-length of 3 years and hence arrive at
a total lifetime of 23 periods. The mandatory retirement date is the end
of period 16, which is equivalent to an age of 68 years. Death probabilities
are taken from the lifetables of the US National Center for Health Statistics,
which report conditional survival probabilities4.
Agents are assumed to maximize a standard instantaneous utility function
of the CRRA-class,
u(cit) =
c1¡¾it ¡ 1
1¡ ¾
setting the coe¢cient of relative risk aversion 1¾equal to 0:5 and the discount
rate ± to 0:97. These values are common in the literature (see Conesa and
Krueger (1999), Campbell, Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (1999) and Cagetti
3The idea here is that selling private equity essentially means selling some of the capital
goods used in the business. The wedge therefore implicitly exists between the purchase
and sale price of capital goods.
4U.S. National Center for Health Statistics (1994)
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and DeNardi (2002)) and consistent with estimates by Gourinchas and Parker
(1999) in their analysis of lifetime consumption pro…les.
Fixed Parameters Value
¾ 2
± 0:97
r 0:05
µ 0:185
Á 0:688
¾2À 0:052
We take the calibration of the wage income process from the detailed
study by Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman (1998). These authors estimate
age-income pro…les for three educational groups from PSID data by regressing
log income on powers of age and some control variables. We select the median
educational group as being most representative for the average household.
g(t) = exp(8:835 + 0:058t¡ 0:017t2=100¡ 0:055t3=10000)
We convert their results obtained for annual data to a 3 year-frequency
by time-aggregation. The autocorrelation coe¢cient Á of the stochastic wage
process is equal to 0:688 for annual data, which implies a coe¢cient of 0:326
for our calibration. The variance of the innovation to log income ¾2À is 0:052
for annual data, resulting in a value of 0:0883 for our modeling frequency.
We approximate the tax system by a proportional tax on exogenous income,
choosing a tax rate µ of 18:5% and calibrate the deterministic component of
retirement income to match the average replacement ratio5 of 45% reported in
Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman (1998) and Engen, Gale and Scholz (1994).
Draws of initial wealth are taken from a lognormal distribution, using the
empirical mean of the wealth distribution for the youngest cohort (equal
to $23; 183 ) and the corresponding coe¢cient of variation of 6:53 given in
Budria, Diaz-Gimenez, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2001). In the aggregation we
used population weights from the 1998 issue of the CPS (Current Population
Survey), truncated below age 20, assuming a long-run real income growth
rate of 1%.
5De…ned as the ratio of pension bene…ts to wage income in last working period.
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Calibrated Parameters Value
Ã 0:867
¾2» 0:004
¹v 0:06
© 1:835
¹ 0:1
½ 0:4
We now discuss the calibration of the asset returns and transaction costs.
For obvious computational reasons, we have restricted the type of assets in
our model to two. The traded asset is supposed to capture the investment
possibilities in the public equity and bond market. The return on this com-
posite asset is assumed to be …xed to further reduce computational costs. We
want to stress that this assumption does not bias the results in our favor, be-
cause in our model there is no motive for holding private equity for portfolio
diversi…cation reasons at all. Such a motive might lower the required rate of
return on private equity, if the correlation between public and private equity
returns was less than perfect. The assumption is justi…ed by the fact that
in the data the index returns to public and private equity are very highly
correlated and therefore portfolio diversi…cation is unlikely to constitute a
major motive for holding private equity. The annual real rate of return on
the …xed asset is assumed to be 5%, in line with estimates of long-run average
returns to public equity and bonds reported in the literature (see for example
Mehra and Prescott (1985) or Heaton and Lucas (1997)). The deterministic
component of the non-traded asset return ¹v, equal to the unconditional mean
of the return distribution, is chosen to imply an empirically plausible share
of entrepreneurs in the population. Gentry and Hubbard (2000) consider
various de…nitions of entrepreneurship and report shares of 8:7% to 11:5% in
the population with 8:7% being their preferred interpretation.
The total return on non-traded private equity also includes a skill and
a business risk component. As pointed out above, the skill component is
equal to the stochastic component of the income process. We choose the
autocorrelation coe¢cient Ã, the weight of skills in the return distribution
and the variance of the innovation to business risk ¾2» in order to achieve a
relatively wide distribution of possible asset returns. Our baseline calibration
sets the annualized values for Ã equal to 0:867, for ¾2» equal to 0:004, and ½
equal to 0:4. These values translate into a span of ¡56:31% to 94:52% for the
unconditional distribution of private equity returns in the calculation using
a grid that is 6 standard deviations wide. Transaction costs are chosen to
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be of a plausible magnitude compared to wages. We set the start-up cost
parameter © equal to 1:835, equivalent to about one annual income for a
young household. This value is subject to some uncertainty, but our choice
seems to be realistic and relatively prudent as Caballero and Hammour (1994)
used a value equal to half a year of production costs for manufacturing in their
calibration. Costly reversibility is captured by the parameter ¹, which we
take to be relatively low with a value of 0:1. Also for this parameter estimates
in the literature vary widely. Dixit and Pindyck (1998) for example assumed
a wedge of 40% in their illustration of the importance of costly reversibility for
the behavior of …rm investment. Obviously, the calibration of the parameters
pertaining to business risk and transaction costs is the most di¢cult, because
very little empirical evidence is available. For this reason, we will provide
some sensitivity analyses for the values of these parameters in the following
section.
4.1 Pure life-cycle results
Eliminating transaction costs and persistence in business risk allows us to
determine the features of our calibrated model implicit in the canonical life-
cycle setup. Without persistence in business risk, information about the
current realization of business risk does not help in forecasting future business
risk realizations and therefore also the informational assumptions are not
relevant. In such a stripped down model, the only reason for observing
results di¤erent from standard static portfolio choice models is the existence
of the liquidity constraint and the fact that wage and private equity returns
are highly correlated. This model probably comes quite close to the setup
that Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) had in mind when interpreting
their empirical results.
The rate of return di¤erence between the traded and the non-traded asset
in this setup is 5:99% over a 3-year period. This is very far from the 10%
annually hypothesized by Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), but in
line with other results in the literature. As expected, the index (22:29%) and
cross-sectional average (21:75%) return on private equity are basically equal.
Since there are no transaction costs and there is no persistence in returns, the
only source of divergence of these two measures is the di¤erent weighting of
individually realized returns implied by di¤erent sizes of the asset stocks held
by agents. Conditional on holding the non-traded asset, non-traded equity is
very concentrated in entrepreneur’s portfolios. The average portfolio share
is very high at 94%. Portfolio choice is essentially a 0-1 choice due to the
observable skill component in returns, which makes returns conditional on a
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good skill realization very attractive in comparison with the riskless asset and
induces agents to shift their wealth holdings into the non-traded asset. An
important implication of this is however, that portfolio shares are extremely
volatile. The average number of start-ups per agent (de…ned as the event
that an agent not holding the non-traded asset holds some of it in the next
period) is measured at 3:1 start-ups per agent. Average rates of return are
independent of the age of the business and due to the liquidity constraint
are slightly higher for young agents, than for older agents. In sum, the
canonical version of the life-cycle model with a portfolio choice component
does not su¢ce for resolving the portfolio choice dimension of the private
equity premium puzzle. The required excess returns are substantial and the
portfolio shares are much too volatile.
5 Private equity as a non-tradable asset
Taking into account the importance of transaction costs and incomplete in-
formation about private equity returns, the model performs much better. It
roughly reproduces the relative size of the private equity market to the pub-
lic equity and bond market, which Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)
…nd to be about 1 : 2. Also concerning the wealth distribution our model
…ts the empirical data quite well. The wealth distributions are generally
skewed to the left with median wealth lower than average wealth for any
age group and both entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs. The share of to-
tal wealth held by entrepreneurs is 38:1%, which corresponds closely to the
37:7% reported by Gentry and Hubbard (2000). As in US data, entrepre-
neurs are also signi…cantly wealthier on average than non-entrepreneurs. In
our baseline calibration, entrepreneurs hold on average 3:9 times the average
wealth of non-entrepreneurs, while Gentry and Hubbard (2000) report an
average wealth ratio of 6:8 : 1. In general, the consumption pro…le of entre-
preneurs is di¤erent from the consumption pro…le of the general population,
with entrepreneurs having increasing rather than hump-shaped consumption
pro…les. This behavior is consistent with di¤erent savings incentives for en-
trepreneurs and workers, a hypothesis formulated by Quadrini (1999) in his
study of wealth concentration, social mobility and entrepreneurship.
We calculate private equity returns by drawing random samples from
the population of entrepreneurs and compute them as they are de…ned in
12
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) p. 30
retit = vit +
µ
Value of business at time t
Value of original investment
¶1=(Years since founded)
¡ 1
where “Value of business at time t” takes into account costly reversibility
and “Value of original investment” includes start-up costs.
The cross-sectional average return equals 5:03% annually (16:0% for a 3
year horizon) and hence is almost equivalent to the rate of return on the
riskless asset. The return on an index of all private equity held is somewhat
higher and calculated as 7:13% annually (22:9% for a 3 year horizon). At
the same time, the cross-sectional ex post-return distribution is very wide,
ranging from ¡64:06% to +85:2% for a 3 year horizon, with a standard
deviation of 0:18. Hence, although the average entrepreneur does NOT earn
a rate of return above the public market rate, and holding private equity is
associated with substantial idiosyncratic risk, agents are willing to take the
risk of entrepreneurship.
Although average returns are low and the volatility of returns is high,
entrepreneurs hold large shares of their wealth in private equity of a single
…rm. The model implies an average of 88:7%, which is quite close to the 82%
reported by Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002). Figure 1 shows that,
while most agents do not hold private equity at all, those that do have large
holdings relative to their own wealth.
A central aspect of the model is the fact that average rates of return on
private equity vary systematically with the age of entrepreneurs and the age
of the …rm. Young agents with high skills require low average rates of return
to start a business, since by starting a business they can use their skills more
productively. These agents do not know their business risk realization, and
they are inclined to take the risk of paying the start-up cost to learn it, since
they can reap the bene…ts of running a pro…table business for a long time.
Later in life, agents are wealthier on average, but they require larger rates
of return to start a business because they are able to exploit high rates of
return from a shorter period of time and as retirement nears, they become
e¤ectively more risk-averse. The second fact also a¤ects the required return
for agents holding private equity already. The reason for this is that when the
certain component of lifetime income shrinks and the slope of the earnings
pro…le decreases, agents lower their demand for risky assets (see Campbell,
Chan and Viceira 2003). As a result, the average rate of return on private
equity increases with the age of the entrepreneur.
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Figure 1: Portfolio shares of private equity
The model also implies that young …rms have relatively low rates of return
and relatively large failure rates. Average …rm age in our baseline calibra-
tion is 12:6 years and only slightly higher than the 10:7 years reported by
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002). Median …rm age is less than aver-
age …rm age, indicating that most …rms have relatively short lives. In fact,
the survival rate of …rms above 12 years is only 36:1%, approximately equal
to the 34% survival rate for a 10 year horizon quoted in Moskowitz and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2002).
The following section is dedicated to an analysis of the determinants of
becoming an entrepreneur and sensitivity of these results to changes in the
calibration of the model and an exploration of the mechanism generating the
results presented above.
5.1 Determinants of entrepreneurship
The characteristics of entrepreneurs implied by the model are also quite ap-
pealing. Entrepreneurs are more skilled and wealthier than the population
average. The empirical literature (Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Holtz-Eakin,
Joulfaian and Rosen (1994), Hurst and Lusardi (2002) and Hamilton (2000))
has established that large positive income shocks have a positive e¤ect on the
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Figure 2: Average returns by agent age
Figure 3: Average returns by …rm age
probability of becoming an entrepreneur in the future. Our model generates
a similar result. Agents that are relatively wealthy are more likely to become
entrepreneurs. This e¤ect is particularly strong early in life and young agents
might enter entrepreneurship even if their skill level is very low. Figures 4 -
6 show the combinations of skill and wealth that lead to business start-ups
for three di¤erent ages. At age 2, wealth and skills are positively correlated
with trying entrepreneurship. Wealthy agents become entrepreneurs, even
when the expected return to private equity is quite low. On the other hand,
skilled agents that have high expected returns do not become entrepreneurs,
if their wealth is low. While the e¤ect of the liquidity constraint is present
for all ages, the former e¤ect diminishes as the agent’s age increases. At age
15 (the retirement date), only agents with high skill realizations enter en-
trepreneurship, in order to exploit their high expected return on non-traded
equity.
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Figure 4: Wealth and skills at start-up at age 2
Figure 5: Wealth and skills at start-up at age 8
Figure 6: Wealth and skills at start-up at age 15
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The reason for the diminishing incentive for wealthy individuals to en-
ter entrepreneurship even if expected returns are low, is that the value of
the informational advantage they gain from becoming entrepreneurs dimin-
ishes with age. Older agents have less incentive to acquire information on
their business risk realization by becoming entrepreneurs, because they can-
not pro…t from the potential wealth increases implied by good business risk
realizations as long as young agents - simply because of their shorter hori-
zon. The value of information about the current business risk realization is
also sharply reduced, if the persistence of the stochastic process governing
it is low. The e¤ect of reducing the persistence of business risk is shown
in Figures 7 - 9. The incentive to become an entrepreneur early in life is
less wealth-dependent than in the previous case. The e¤ect of wealth also
dimishes with age however. As before, the liquidity constraint deters agents
with high skills and low wealth from entering entrepreneurship.
Figure 7: Wealth and skills at start-up at age 2
Figure 8: Wealth and skills at start-up at age 8
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Figure 9: Wealth and skills at start-up at age 15
Exiting entrepreneurship not surprisingly is related more to the business
risk realization than to skills or wealth. The decision to exit is also quite
independent of age prior to retirement. Only after retirement, more and
more agents exit entrepreneurship to invest their wealth into the safe asset.
This feature is a consequence of the motive for “strategic risk allocation”
outlined in Campbell, Chan and Viceira 2003. The following section will
outline the results derived from alternative calibrations of transaction costs
and the persistence of business risk.
6 Some sensitivity analysis
In the following, we take the set of …xed parameters and the determinis-
tic component of private equity returns ¹v as given and concentrate on the
remaining calibrated parameters. Our results are summarized in Table 1,
which gives summary statistics for the average, median and standard devi-
ation of cross-sectional returns to private equity, the return on an index of
private equity and the average share of total wealth held in private equity
conditional on holding private equity at all.
Table 1:
Cross- sect ion of pr ivate equ ity re turns M ean ind ex re tu rn on
E xcess m e an re tu rn M edian return S tan d. D ev. p ort fo l io share private equ ity
B ASE LINE 0:23% 16:32% 0:182 0:88 23:0%
FIXEDCO STHIGH 0:27% 17:07% 0:198 0:83 23:8%
DISIN VES THIG H ¡2:37% 13:51% 0:186 0:76 23:0%
PE RSISTE NCELOW ¡1:14% 15:65% 0:181 0:80 19:7%
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The …rst column contains the name of the parameter set used. The actual
parameter values used for each calibration can be read from Table 2 below.
Table 2:
Ã ¾2» © ¹ ½
BASELINE 0:867 0:004 1:835 0:1 0:4
FIXEDCOSTHIGH 0:867 0:004 3:670 0 0:4
DISINVESTHIGH 0:867 0:004 0 0:25 0:4
PERSISTENCELOW 0:546 0:011 1:835 0:1 0:4
1
For this run , a l l age nts are a llow ed to obse rve the ir busine ss r isk rea liza t ion
6.1 Alternative transaction cost structures
Varying the structure of transaction costs does not have a large e¤ect on our
main results. Neither the presence of …xed start-up costs, nor the presence
of costly reversibility are necessary to reproduce the main …ndings. With
respect to other interesting statistics, disregarding either of these costs wors-
ens the performance of our model however. Neglecting start-up costs has
the e¤ect of changing the age structure of entrepreneurs and the size dis-
tribution of …rms. Most entrepreneurs start their business early in life and
some keep very small businesses. This is also related to the assumption of
non-observable and persistent business risk, meaning that it is worth run-
ning a very small, but not pro…table business, in order to be informed about
business risk realizations. Figure 10 shows that the share of entrepreneurs
rises very quickly and is too high for this alternative set of parameters.
Neglecting costly reversibility and setting start-up costs twice as high as
before ($36; 900) leads to start-ups later in life. The average age of entre-
preneurs rises to 60:8 years, from an already relatively high number of 56:6
years in the baseline run. Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) report an
average age of entrepreneurs of 46:5 years, closer to the 50:6 years resulting
from the case without start-up costs, but high disinvestment costs. Also,
the increased start-up costs lead to a bimodal distribution of portfolio shares
(Figure 11), with some agents avoiding to exit the business completely, but
rather allocating only a small share of their wealth to private equity in some
periods.
6.2 Persistence in business risk
The parameters de…ning the distribution of private equity returns are hard to
calibrate, but at the same time fundamental for the question we would like to
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Figure 10: The share of entrepreneurs
answer. Both, the persistence of business risk realizations and the volatility of
the private equity return play an important role in the model. Concerning the
persistence of business risk realizations, there is no information to be gained
from the SCF, since it is not a panel study and few alternative information
sources exist. Studies (e.g. Quadrini (1999)) on the wealth distribution and
on the savings choices of entrepreneurs suggest that the persistence in total
returns to private equity is relatively high. In order to check the robustness of
results with respect to the persistence in business risk, we have also computed
a run with little persistence in business risk, such that the main source of
serial correlation in private equity returns is the skill component. Results are
robust in the sense that our main …ndings do not change even if business
risk is less persistent. In fact, average private equity returns are even lower
than in the baseline scenario because entrepreneurs do not exit as quickly
after observing a bad business risk realization. However, big changes occur
in a di¤erent dimension. The average lifetime of a private …rm increases
drastically if business risk is less persistent and the shape of the survival rate
distribution changes. Figure 12 shows the histogram of …rms’ lifetimes for the
case of low persistence in business risk, labeled PERSISTENCELOW. Very
few …rms live for less than twelve years, and the average is 10:16 periods,
corresponding to approximately 30 years in real time. This is much shorter
than estimates in the literature reported above.
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Figure 11: Portfolio shares of private equity
7 Conclusions
We have shown that the characteristics of private equity returns and portfolio
allocations documented by Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) emerge
from a simple model of occupational choice over the life cycle. More specif-
ically, the average return on private equity is not higher than the return on
the riskless asset, but much more variable and agents holding private equity
allocate a large share of their total wealth to it. In our model, average pri-
vate equity returns are increasing in both, the age of the …rm owner and
the age of the business. Transaction costs associated with investing into and
disinvesting from a private business lower the average cross-sectional return
on private equity in comparison to the return on an index of private equity
and make these returns roughly equal to the return on a riskless asset. Since
returns to private equity are not directly observable by non-entrepreneurs,
average …rm life is relatively short and entrepreneurs with bad business risk
realizations exit quickly. The implied survival rates of …rms are in line with
estimates in the literature.
Our baseline calibration also yields attractive results with respect to the
wealth distribution. Entrepreneurs are on average 3:9 times wealthier than
non-entrepreneurs. The sensitivity analysis shows that results are quite ro-
bust to di¤erent speci…cations of transaction costs. However, the existence
of transaction costs and high persistence in business risk realizations are nec-
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Figure 12: Histogram of …rm duration
essary ingredients to generate these results. The main determinants for be-
coming an entrepreneur are the agent’s age, wealth and skills. Young agents
with high skills or high wealth hold private equity, despite the low average
return realization. Older agents are less likely to start-up a business, they
do so only when the expected rate of return is quite high. We have largely
neglected tax-issues so far, but intend to study the impact of tax systems on
the propensity of becoming an entrepreneur in the future. We also think that
this framework would be a good basis for studying the decision to convert
private equity to public equity through an initial public o¤ering (IPO).
Appendix: Numerical procedure
The numerical method we use is …nite state, …nite horizon dynamic program-
ming. We discretize the state space, de…ned over asset stocks and uncertainty
states. Fineness of the grid basically determines computation time, which is
linear in lifetime and quadratic for each asset in the number of gridpoints
considered.
Given some discretization of the state space, for each point in time
t = 1; 2; :::; T , optimal policy rules are computed, describing the optimal
adjustments in the levels of the two assets in the portfolio between t and
t + 1: These rules are made given the level of each asset when taking a de-
cision and conditional on the states of uncertainty over idiosyncratic income
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risk and business risk observed prior to the decision. Optimal decisions are
recursively computed, starting by setting the level of assets in T +1 to zero,
and then updating the continuation value at each point in time, according
to the optimal decisions between the …nal period and the current period.
While those optimal policies are found by going backwards from the end of
life to the beginning of life, the actual solution paths for each individual i
2 f1; 2; :::; Ig are found by applying the optimal policy rules going forward
from the beginning of life to the end of life. At the very beginning of life,
individuals di¤er only according to the amount of initial wealth they are
endowed with. During lifetime they di¤er according to the their individual
histories of idiosyncratic income shocks and business risk realizations. This
explains the distribution of solution paths over assets and consumption in
the population of I6 individuals.
Having obtained the solution paths for the entire population according to
individual draws of initial wealth and shock histories, it is straightforward to
aggregate and to calculate statistics for the population. The basic problem is
to translate a set of longitudinal observations for a population of individuals
into a representative cross-section at a given point in time. First, we make
sure that the age-structure in the observed population (as taken from the
CPS) corresponds to the age-structure of the simulated economy. Therefore,
starting from the longitudinal simulated paths for the I individuals, we split
the sample into T age groups, such that for each age the its share in the
population corresponds to its share in the CPS. Second, the simulated values
for each age group are translated into a common unit of account, by adjusting
for the aggregate real income growth rate.
Aggregation and the number of individuals do not increase computation
time by much, once the optimal decision rules are computed, the marginal
computational cost of further numerical analysis is low.
The application of dynamic programming techniques in this case requires
a very special structure, due to the informational assumptions speci…c to
returns on private equity. In the computation of optimal decisions we must
distinguish two groups of agents. The …rst group are the entrepreneurs, who
can observe business risk, for whom we compute optimal decisions condi-
tional on the observed realizations of uncertainty in both the dimension of
business risk and idiosyncratic income risk. The second group are the non-
entrepreneurs, de…ned as holding zero entrepreneurial assets, for whom policy
rules are computed conditional on the observed realizations of idiosyncratic
income shocks only, while using the unconditional distribution over business
risk. When simulating the optimal paths for the individuals those two sets
6We simulate a population of I = 50000 individuals to compute our statistics.
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of rules must be applied appropriately, depending on whether at the point of
decision the individual does hold the entrepreneurial asset or not.
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